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KAR IN BOW I E
Chapter 5
Publicity, Parties and Patronage:
Parliamentary Management and the
Ratification of the Anglo-Scottish Union
Since 1707, observers have asked to what degree the Scottish parliament
of 1706–7 was ‘managed’ into ratifying a treaty of union with
England. Given the national spirit evident in the Scottish parliament
at its sessions of 1703 and 1704, it has seemed to many that
only clandestine activity could explain the members’ turn towards
accepting an incorporating union. As one contemporary put it, when
he considered ‘hou opposite the same parliament [in] 1703 wer with
thir measures, I incline to think a Scots parliament that sits beyond
2 or 3 years are soe far modelled by English Influence that they are noe
longer vox populi’.1 Leading Scottish historians from George Lockhart
of Carnwath in the early eighteenth century to William Ferguson in
the later twentieth century have emphasised the role of patronage and
secret payments in creating a majority for incorporating union, while
the eminent historian of the Union, P. W. J. Riley, has pointed to the
harnessing of members into noble-led factions.2 More recent research,
however, has stressed the ideological foundations of these factions
and their alignment in a Court-Country party structure influenced by
an increasingly activist and public political culture.3 It is no longer
adequate to claim that the Union was ‘bought’ by means of political
jobbery; instead, political management must be placed in a wider
context of ideological loyalties and public politics. This is not, however,
to downplay management as representing an underlying ‘business as
usual’ in a pre-modern parliamentary system. Of course the crown tried
to manage Parliament; but what is interesting is the degree to which
1 National Library of Scotland (NLS), Wodrow quarto xl, item 8 (newsletter),
4 November 1706.
2 D. Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’: Lockhart of Carnwath’s Memoirs of the Union (Aberdeen,
1995); W. Ferguson, ‘The making of the treaty of Union of 1707’, Scottish Historical
Review, 43 (1964), pp. 89–110; P. W. J. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland
(Manchester, 1978).
3 C. A. Whatley, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 2006); D. J. Patrick and
C. A. Whatley, ‘Persistence, principle and patriotism in the making of the Union
of 1707: The Revolution, Scottish Parliament and the squadrone volante’, History,
92 (2007), pp. 162–86; K. M. Brown, ‘Party politics and parliament: Scotland’s
last election and its aftermath, 1702–3’, in K. M. Brown and A. J. Mann (eds), The
History of the Scottish Parliament, vol. II: Parliament and Politics in Scotland 1567–1707
(Edinburgh, 2005), pp. 245–86; K. Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish
Union, 1699–1707 (Woodbridge, 2007).
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its ministers failed to do so between 1700 and 1705. Given this failure,
how significant were the well-known management methods deployed in
1706–7?
This chapter will assess the impact of management in the ratification
of the Union treaty, not by rehearsing familiar instances of patronage
and power-broking, but by demonstrating how these tactics evolved in
response to the rise of more public and partisan politics in Scotland.
It will argue that from the Darien crisis onwards, the changing
nature of Scottish politics challenged the crown’s normal methods of
management and forced ministers to develop a wider range of practices,
including concessions to oppositional opinion expressed in public
debate, to rebuild a Court party majority. By tracing the interaction
between public and party politics and the crown’s management efforts
from 1700, the chapter will provide a contextual understanding of the
role of management in the passage of the Union treaty in 1706–7.
***
Popular and party politics began to make real trouble for William and
his Scottish government in May 1700, when ministers lost control of
Parliament in a session lasting just nine days. A volatile combination
of economic and political grievances had exploded, fanned by Country
party agitations. Economic complaints had been swelling as repeated
crop failures, combined with the falling trade and higher taxes
associated with William’s Nine Years War (1688–1697), produced a
severe recession. In a declining economy, the hopes of many had
been pinned on the Company of Scotland and its attempt to found a
colony at Darien on territory claimed by Spain. The extensive publicity
efforts of the Company had created a strong popular perception of
the colony as a patriotic enterprise. Further, the Company’s allegations
of English attempts to wreck capital subscriptions in London and
Hamburg, combined with the king’s public refusal to back the Company,
aroused angry resentment in Scotland. In August 1699, a Scottish
correspondent had warned William Carstares, the king’s chaplain and
adviser in London, that ‘you cannot believe how great an edge is upon
persons of all degrees and ranks here’ for the Darien colony, threatened
as it was by Spanish invasion and denied English aid. Though more
recent historians have demonstrated the internal weaknesses of the
Darien project, the information publicly available at the time had led
many Scots to blame the failure on the English and the king they shared
with the English.4
As the Company and its colony were widely viewed as a Scottish
national enterprise, the affairs of the Company became enmeshed in
4 Whatley, Scots and the Union, chap 4; D. Watt, The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union
and the Wealth of Nations (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 41–3, 47–63, 79–89; J. McCormick
(ed.), State-Papers and Letters Addressed to William Carstares, (Edinburgh, 1774), p. 488;
A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, 1685–1750, in the Possession of the
Right Hon. Sir George Henry Rose, 3 vols (London, 1831), vol. iii, pp. 179–81, 184.
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parliamentary party politics. The Company had petitioned Parliament
for backing in 1698, and had secured an address from the estates to the
king. In October 1699, Company directors petitioned the king to ask for
a new meeting of Parliament so ‘that your Majesty may have the Advice
and Assistance of the Great Council of this Nation in such a weighty and
general concern’.5 At the same time, the second marquis of Tweeddale
began to work with the duke of Hamilton and the earl of Tullibardine
(later first duke of Atholl) to initiate a popular address to the king. When
the government attempted to discourage signatures by means of a royal
proclamation, public outrage spurred more to sign. With a reported
21,000 signatures, the national address was presented in London to
King William by Tweeddale on 25 March 1700. A further eight petitions
from certain shires and burghs were presented to Parliament at a session
called for 21May 1700 after repeated delays.6 Alongside these petitions,
printed and manuscript pamphlets also began to circulate in support of
the opposition and its demands.7
While the national address asked the king to allow Parliament to
meet ‘to support the Interest and Credit’ of the Company of Scotland,
the eight petitions to Parliament from shires and burghs outlined a
broad set of grievances that went beyond the problems of the Company.
Alongside assertions of the rights of the Company of Scotland and its
colony, complaints were also made about rising poverty, the decay of
trade due to the war with France and the continuing French prohibitions
on key Scottish exports, and the king’s maintenance of standing armed
forces in peacetime Scotland, despite the disbanding of such forces
in England. Though respect for conventions meant the petitioners
refrained from attacking the king directly, their patriotic rhetoric
portrayed the Company’s problems as a blow to Scotland’s honour,
requiring vindication by Parliament.8
The Country party’s campaign presented a new kind of public
challenge to the Scottish ministry – a challenge that it proved unready to
meet as Parliament opened in May. At the start of the session, the duke
5 C. Innes and T. Thomson (eds), Acts of the Parliament of Scotland (APS), 12 vols
(Edinburgh, 1814–1875), vol. x, p. 134, appendix at pp. 19–20, 24; A Full and Exact
Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating to the Company of Scotland ([Edinburgh], 1700),
pp. 7–26, 87.
6 Edinburgh, National Archives of Scotland (NAS), Papers of the Dukes of Hamilton and
Brandon, GD 406/1/444, 4368; A Full and Exact Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating
to the Company of Scotland, pp. 105–7; Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont,
pp. 192–8; L. W. Sharp (ed.), Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, 1698–1709 (Edinburgh,
1937), p. 59; APS, vol. x, appendix at pp. 34–41.
7 These included Anon., The People of Scotland’s Groans and Lamentable Complaints
([Edinburgh, 1700]); [George Ridpath], Scotland’s Grievances relating to Darien
([Edinburgh], 1700); [William Seton of Pitmedden], Memorial to the Members of
Parliament of the Court Party ([Edinburgh, 1700]); Anon., A Short Speech Prepared to be
Spoken, by a Worthy Member in Parliament ([Edinburgh], 1700); Anon.,Heads of Things Fit
to be Granted and Done in the Ensuing Session of Parliament (1700), Edinburgh, National
Library of Scotland, Adv. MS. 83.7.6(154). See also Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion,
pp. 30, 32, 70–3.
8 APS, vol. x, appendix at pp. 36–41.
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of Queensberry and the earl of Marchmont used their speeches as royal
commissioner and chancellor respectively to encourage loyal obedience
to the king, emphasising the debt owed to him for the Revolution
and for the re-establishment of Presbyterianism within the national
Church. But it soon became clear that recent events held more weight
for many in the Court party and they deserted to the opposition. The
Country party gained an early ‘resolve’ [formal resolution] intended
to wrest control of the session away from the government: ‘that all
motions and overtures be first made in plain Parliament and that
no motion or overture come in from any of the Committees but
upon matters first remitted to them by the Parliament’. Overtures
from the government in favour of the Presbyterian establishment
and against popery and profanity –made to reinforce the fidelity
of Presbyterian members –were countered with demands for the
rescinding of acts confirming the king’s power to call and dissolve the
General Assembly. Attention then turned to the Company of Scotland,
with the presentation of a new petition from the Company, the eight
local petitions and a ‘resolve’ from the duke of Hamilton ‘asserting the
Companie’s interest and legal title to Caledonia in Darien’. Faced with
these challenges, on 30 May Queensberry adjourned Parliament to 20
June to enable him to seek further instructions from the king. On 17
June, a proclamation further postponed the session until 4 July.9
This debacle in May demonstrated to the government that, in
the present circumstances, they could not maintain a stable Court
party majority with their usual methods. The degree of anger felt
across Scotland over the king’s policies, encouraged by the Country
party’s public protests, had created rebellion within the estates. William,
as usual, refused to come to Scotland to help his ministers woo members
and he did not authorise any concessions on the opposition’s key
complaints. Though the king’s letter to Parliament expressed regret
for Scotland’s recent ‘misfortunes and losses’ and promised new acts
to encourage trade, it offered no explicit support for the Company of
Scotland nor any public rationale for William’s refusal to defend the
Darien colony.10
At the time of Queensberry’s initial adjournment, the Country
party maintained its pressure on the government by organising an
immediate address to the king from about ninety members demanding
the re-assembly of the estates. On 20 June, party leaders encouraged
illuminations in Edinburgh in favour of the Darien colony, triggering
9 APS, vol. x, pp. 190–4, appendix at pp. 34–5; Sir David Hume of Crossrigg, A Diary
of the Proceedings of the Parliament and Privy Council of Scotland, May 21, 1700—March 7,
1707 (Edinburgh, 1823), pp. 1–6; A Full and Exact Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating
to the Company of Scotland, p. 127; NAS, PC 13/3/1700 (17 June 1700).
10 APS, vol. x, p. 190. During the summer of 1700, James Hodges proposed himself
to viscount Seafield as a pamphleteer in the king’s interest for a salary of £300, but
though Seafield expressed interest, Hodges’ services were not taken up and by 1703
he was writing for the opposition. McCormick (ed.), State-Papers and Letters addressed to
William Carstares, p. 598.
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a major riot in which the homes of government supporters were
attacked.11 By July, ‘a great Number’ of signatures were being collected
for a third address to the king. This address demanded a Parliament
not just to support the colony but also to pass acts to assert the freedom
of the Scottish kingdom, secure the king from outside influence, and
reduce the corrupting power of patronage in the Scottish Parliament.
A further call for an act of habeas corpus also appeared.12 These points
were echoed in pamphlets, as Country discourse shifted towards a broad
critique of English hegemony in the Union of Crowns.13
With a nearly-empty Scottish treasury limiting patronage
opportunities, ministers began to despair of managing Parliament
without the king’s presence in Scotland. Fortunately for them, the
final collapse of the Darien colony allowed ministers to issue a
conciliatory proclamation in William’s name in early August. This stated
that – although the loss of the colony now made a declaration of support
for it unnecessary – the king would seek the release of colonists held
captive by Spain and would support parliamentary measures to assist
the Company. Aided by this expression of royal empathy, leading
ministers and their lieutenants, including the duke of Queensberry,
viscount Seafield, and the earls of Argyll and Mar, worked busily to
restore relations with their followers.14
By the time Parliament reconvened on 29 October 1700, the
abandonment of the colony and the blandishments of ministers had
started to bring some Court party rebels back to the fold. As royal
commissioner, the duke of Queensberry sought to develop good
relations with members by inviting them to join him for dinner
on the king’s birthday. Ministers deployed other patronage carrots
and sticks, prompting a parliamentary resolve from Hamilton against
anyone ‘offering a good deed or office, or threatening Members of
Parliament for votes’.15 Yet alongside these methods, the government
also acknowledged oppositional complaints. The king’s letter to
Parliament offered a justification for his failure to support the Darien
colony and promised to approve ‘what shall be reasonably proposed’
to assist the Company of Scotland.16 Moreover, economic grievances
were dealt with as Parliament devoted three months of deliberations to
11 Full and Exact Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating to the Company of Scotland,
pp. 127–9; J. Grant (ed.), Seafield Correspondence from 1685 to 1708 (Edinburgh, 1912),
p. 290; Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, pp. 210–11; Bowie, Scottish
Public Opinion, pp. 34–5; Watt, Price of Scotland, pp. 197–9.
12 Full and Exact Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating to the Company of Scotland,
pp. 133–7; Grant (ed.), Seafield Correspondence, p. 304.
13 See note 7.
14 Grant (ed.), Seafield Correspondence, pp. 299–303; NAS, PC 13/3/1700 (6 August 1700);
Full and Exact Collection of . . . Publick Papers, relating to the Company of Scotland,
pp. 130–2; McCormick (ed.), State-Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares,
pp. 585, 601, 603, 611, 618, 647.
15 McCormick (ed.), State-Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares, pp. 595, 611;
Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 9, 23.
16 APS, vol. x, pp. 201–2.
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proposals to improve trade. These led to an act blocking the import of
French wine in hopes of persuading France to lift its barriers against
Scottish trade. The government also backed acts against popery and
profanity and an act ‘anent wrongous imprisonment’ (habeas corpus).17
Having made these concessions, the government was better able to
manage the debates on the Company of Scotland when these were
resumed, although its influence was limited. In mid-December, an
observer noted that ‘the Country party are much weakened’ and that
they would ‘desist from pressing Caledonia any more’, but in January
1701 Hamilton’s party offered, and secured unanimous support for,
a series of patriotic resolves which attacked the English Parliament
for ‘undue Intermeddling in the Affairs of this Kingdom’ and which
characterised the English proclamations of 1699 forbidding aid to
the Darien colonists as ‘inhumane barbarous and contrare to the law
of Nations’. Another petition from the Company and eighteen new
addresses from shires and burghs continued the pressure for an act to
assert the rights of the Company. Despite this, the Court managed to
convince a small majority to support an address to the king rather than
an act, in part on the pragmatic grounds that ‘an Address without an Act
would be better than an Act without the Royal Assent’. Unusually for the
royal commissioner, Queensberry offered a speech to Parliament as part
of the debate. The final vote split 108 to 84, or 56% to 44%, for the less
provocative address.18
Ministers retained their fragile hold on Parliament only by means
of another compromise, this time on supply for the standing forces.
As Country speakers argued for a militia to replace the standing
army, government speakers, again including Queensberry, reminded
members of the army’s importance in maintaining the Revolution.
Country opposition succeeded in reducing troop numbers from over
4,000 to 3,000, with a motion to reduce the forces to only 2,000
defeated by just fourteen voices (108 to 94). Ministers secured a six-
month cess (land tax) to fund the agreed 3,000-man force, but had to
assure members that any troops maintained above this number would
be financed from the king’s own excise revenues.19
In the following year, the Country party escalated its opposition by
withdrawing from the new Queen Anne’s first meeting of Parliament
on the grounds that new elections should have been called according
to a 1696 act regulating the succession on William’s death. At the
opening of Parliament on 9 June 1702, Hamilton led out his party to the
cheering of crowds around Parliament House. A petition to the queen
17 Minuts of the Proceedings in Parliament, nos. 1–57 (29 October 1700–1 February 1701);
Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, p. 215; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary,
pp. 23, 36.
18 Sharp (ed.), Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 135; Minuts, no. 37 (9 January 1701);
no. 38 (10 January 1701); no. 40 (13 January 1701); nos. 46–7 (20–21 January 1701);
Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 45–51; APS, vol. x, pp. 242–57, appendix at pp. 73–86.
19 Minuts, no. 49 (23 Jan 1701); no. 50 (24 Jan 1701); nos. 52–6 (27–31 Jan 1701).
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soon followed, signed by dozens of members, along with supporters
in Edinburgh. The Faculty of Advocates also initiated a petition to the
queen to protest the illegality of the session. Although Anne refused
to accept the Country party petition, and Parliament quashed the
Advocates’ address as unwarrantable, together these protests cast a
shadow over all the acts passed by the rump Parliament. The Country
party attempted to raise a boycott of the cess authorised in the 1702
session, but although the boycott worried the government, the Country
party’s legal challenge to Anne’s Parliament was not as effective in
motivating support at the grassroots level as the Darien issue had been
in 1700–1. As Robert Wylie, minister of Hamilton parish and political
adviser to the duke of Hamilton, pointed out in July, the party had failed
to publish pamphlets explaining their stance and the issues proved
opaque to many.20
Besides the cess, Queensberry in 1702 also secured acts confirming
Anne’s accession and authorising negotiations with England for a closer
union. Yet even within a Court-dominated rump Parliament, he faced
management problems. Differences emerged between Episcopalian and
Presbyterian interests, as Anne’s association with high Anglican Tories
in England encouraged Episcopalian dissenters in Scotland. On the
presentation of an act to confirm the Presbyterian Church settlement,
Sir Alexander Bruce (later earl of Kincardine), commissioner for
the burgh of Sanquhar, argued that Scottish Presbyterianism was
‘inconsistent with the essence of monarchy’. After being expelled from
the house by an appalled Presbyterian majority, Bruce subsequently
published a version of his inflammatory comments as a pamphlet.
Chancellor Marchmont responded by introducing an act for the
abjuration of the pretender, which would have blocked any Jacobite
Episcopalians from sitting in Parliament or holding office under Anne.
Faced with Marchmont’s unilateral action, Queensberry was forced to
adjourn Parliament.21
With her 1702 act for union negotiations, Anne sought to fulfil
William’s vision for an incorporating union as a means to neutralise
an increasingly activist, populist and partisan Scottish political system.
Among Country pamphleteers, only the London-based writer, George
Ridpath, engaged with this act in 1702, publishing a tract to influence
the union negotiations that were held over the winter of 1702–3.22
In Scotland, party attention remained focused on the domestic scene
as Martinmas elections produced a new grouping of Episcopalian and
20 APS, vol. xi, p. 5; A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, pp. 239–41;
Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 13–14; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 83, 89–90,
93–4; NAS, GD 406/1/4813, 4815, 4830, 5181, 4900; Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion,
pp. 35–6.
21 Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 83–95; Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 14–17;
[Sir Alexander Bruce], A Speech in the Parliament of Scotland ([1702]); Riley, The Union,
pp. 37–9.
22 [George Ridpath], A Discourse upon the Union of Scotland and England (1702).
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Jacobite commissioners to Parliament, known as the ‘Cavaliers’. This,
combined with Anne’s favouring of Episcopalians in her ministerial
appointments, raised the real possibility of a shift in the Court
party away from William’s ideological core of mostly Presbyterian
Revolution supporters towards Episcopalians and even Jacobites.23
When Parliament opened in May 1703, the Court party imploded
as the Cavaliers backed a public campaign for legal toleration of
Episcopalian worship, and Court and Country Presbyterians came
together in opposition.
Pamphlets and petitions were deployed, as a heated public debate
erupted between Episcopalian and Presbyterian interests. In March,
dissenting clergy made a play for royal support with an address asking
for the queen’s indulgence for the practice of their religion. Other
Episcopalians, such as the Jacobite Lord Balcarres in Fife, organised
addresses from lay supporters in localities including the counties of
Fife, Stirling and Angus and the burghs of Glasgow, Dundee, Aberdeen
and Elgin. At the same time, a number of pro-toleration pamphlets
began to appear, among them some by Anne’s new secretary, the earl
of Cromartie (formerly viscount Tarbat). These urged toleration for
dissenters and stressed the breadth of popular support for Episcopalian
worship.24 Presbyterians perceived this as an open challenge to the
Revolution settlement, in particular the Claim of Right’s statement
that prelacy was a grievance of the people. Their vigorous responses
included a petition to the 1703 Parliament from the Commission of the
General Assembly and a number of pamphlets attacking Episcopalian
toleration as dangerous to the Revolution interest and Presbyterian
Church. As one Presbyterian author put it, ‘the Prelatick and Jacobite
party aim at no less, than the overthrow of the present Establishment,
and the Restauration of Prelacy in this Church in spite of the Claim
of Right’. Some writers also linked toleration to the Country issue
of English hegemony, seeing the influence of Anglican Tories in the
Episcopalian dissenters’ campaign.25 On the ground, crowds in Glasgow
demonstrated their concern over Episcopalian ambitions by attacking
one of their local congregations that had begun to meet more openly.26
Led by Marchmont, Argyll and the marquis of Annandale, Court
Presbyterians joined with Country members to brush aside Cavalier
23 Brown, ‘Party politics and parliament’, pp. 254–68.
24 Anon., To the Queen’s Most Excellent Majestie, the Humble Address and Supplication of the
Suffering Episcopal clergy, (1703); Sharp (ed.), Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 255;
NAS, GD 406/1/5181; [George Mackenzie, earl of Cromartie], A Few Brief and Modest
Reflexions Perswading a Just Indulgence to be Granted to the Episcopal Clergy and People in
Scotland ([Edinburgh], 1703); [George Mackenzie, earl of Cromartie], A Continuation of
a Few Brief and Modest Reflexions ([Edinburgh], 1703).
25 The Humble Representation of the Commission of the late General Assembly ([Edinburgh,
1703]); [George Ridpath], An Account of the Proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland,
(1704); [James Hadow], A Survey of the Case (Edinburgh, 1703), p. 4; [James Webster],
An Essay upon Toleration ([Edinburgh], 1703), pp. 19, 24.
26 NLS, Wodrow quarto xxviii, fo. 151; NAS, PC 1/52(520, 524–6).
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overtures for toleration and to pass acts confirming the Revolution and
the Presbyterian Church. In response to the pro-toleration pamphlets,
open criticism of the Claim of Right was now declared treasonous.
Stymied, the Cavaliers retreated from the Court party but remained
a separate faction, leaving neither the Court nor the Country party in
outright control of Parliament.27
As the Court party disintegrated, a Country party agenda for
constitutional reform came to dominate the session, with the
opposition’s return to the patriotic, anti-English rhetoric that it had
developed in 1700–1. While Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun whipped
up resentment of English hegemony and demanded limitations on
the royal prerogative, Cavaliers joined the Country party in delaying
the settlement of the Scottish succession.28 For the moment, deep
ideological differences between Country Presbyterians and Episcopalian
Cavaliers were subsumed in a shared willingness to capitalise on
public discontent and claim the mantle of patriotism. The apparently
nationalist Parliament of 1703 thus represented a marriage of
convenience between two differing oppositional groups, but it was a
marriage riven with potential areas of disagreement.29
The hallmark of the 1703 Parliament, the Act of Security, emerged
from contentious debates launched by a Country resolve from
Tweeddale for ‘such conditions of government and regulations in the
constitution of this Kingdom to take place after the decease of her
Majestie . . . as shall be necessary for the preservation of religion and
liberty’. Further overtures added the preservation of Scottish trade
to this agenda and made radical proposals for limitations on Anne’s
successor. A broad majority approved a final act that, while it did
not place any particular limitations on the prerogative, none the less
insisted that ‘conditions of government’ be enacted to secure Scottish
sovereignty, trade and religion before England’s Hanoverian successor
could be accepted. Reflecting the concerns from 1700–1, this act
also demanded that ‘a free Communication of Trade, the freedom of
Navigation and the liberty of the Plantations’ be secured from the
English. A clause to arm a Protestant militia satisfied earlier arguments
27 APS, vol. xi, pp. 46–7; [Ridpath], An Account of Proceedings, pp. 28–9, 38–9; Szechi
(ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 30–1, 33; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 98, 102–4.
28 The Scottish succession was open because the death of Queen Anne’s last child in
1700 had left the Revolution monarchy without any direct heirs. In 1701 the English
parliament had passed an act naming Sophia of Hanover, a descendant of James
VI and I, as the Protestant heir. Anne’s plan in 1702 for incorporating union would
have settled the succession in Scotland, but with the failure of union talks she needed
the Scottish parliament to accept the ‘Hanoverian succession’ through an act of
parliament or a fresh attempt at union.
29 P. W. J. Riley has rightly questioned historians who interpret the legislation of the
parliament of 1703 as a transparent declaration of Scottish independence, but he
goes too far in the opposite direction by arguing that ‘the Court was faced, not by
a nationalist revolt, but by a problem of parliamentary management which it was
unable to solve’. The Court faced both. P. W. J. Riley, ‘The Scottish parliament of
1703’, Scottish Historical Review, 47 (1968), p. 131.
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on the standing army, while a separate Act anent Peace and War
responded to complaints made concerning the Nine Years War.30
These Parliamentary debates were closely watched as visitors
thronged the house and crowds outside cheered votes on popular issues,
notably the passage of the clause for a trade on an equal footing
with England and its colonies. A wave of printed overtures, speeches
and tracts dealing with free trade, limitations on sovereignty, and the
union of crowns aroused public interest on these issues, with only a
few writers offering a Court point of view.31 Describing free trade as
‘a thing, generally desired by the people of Scotland’, George Ridpath
attributed this to the ‘intollerable Dishonour and Loss in the Affair of
Caledonia’. Anne’s ministers recognised the strength of public feeling,
and Seafield warned London of ‘the great resentment there is in this
nation because of the act of navigation and the loss of our colony of
Caledonia’, recommending that ‘a communicatione of trade . . . be
obtained either by a concession from England or by a treatty of a federal
or intire union’.32
Faced with a Country-Cavalier alliance on patriotic reforms,
Queensberry proved unable to achieve his primary objective of
supply. The Court Presbyterian revolt also continued, as Marchmont
unilaterally offered an overture naming Sophia of Hanover as Anne’s
successor with specific limitations, though not a communication of
trade. The abject failure of this overture exposed the queen’s weakness
on the succession issue. While the Cavaliers opposed the Hanoverian
settlement in principle, even Revolution supporters expected to secure
significant reforms of the Union of the Crowns before conceding the
succession.33 Queensberry indicated that he would give the royal assent
to the Act anent Peace and War in hopes that this would gain him
supply; but after three months of uncontrolled debate, during which
the Country party twice threatened to address the queen, he was forced
to adjourn without giving the royal assent to the Act of Security.34
Queensberry responded to the embarrassment of 1703 by attempting
to smear his noble rivals as Jacobites in a plot that backfired and
cost him his job as royal commissioner. Anne responded by inviting
the Presbyterian wing of the Country party into government in
30 [Ridpath], Account of Proceedings, pp. 134–8, 188–9; APS, vol. xi, pp. 41, 63, 69–70,
74–5, 107; Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, p. 38; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 100,
109, 112, 115.
31 Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, who published in support of an incorporating union in
1706, started to write for the Court party in 1703. Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, History
of the Union of Scotland and England, D. Duncan (trans. and ed.), (Edinburgh, 1993),
p. 3.
32 [Ridpath], Account of Proceedings, pp. 193–8; H. Paton (ed.), Report on the Laing
Manuscripts preserved in the University of Edinburgh, 2 vols. (London, 1914–1925), vol. ii,
p. 36.
33 Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 131–2.
34 Anon., Overture by Way of Act Concerning the Succession (1703); [Ridpath], Account of
Proceedings, pp. 21–3, 328–31; Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 37, 39; APS, vol. xi,
pp. 84, 112; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, p. 118, 133–4.
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the hope of creating a Revolution coalition that would vote for
the Hanoverian succession with limitations. Led by Tweeddale and
including Marchmont, this group became known as the New Party
(and, by 1705, as the squadrone volante). While the idea of a Revolution
coalition for the succession was plausible in theory, in practice the queen
could not offer sufficient reforms to win the succession. Meanwhile,
factional rivalry ensured that Queensberry’s followers moved into the
opposition.35
As in 1703, the 1704 Parliament took place in an atmosphere of
keen public interest. This interest was fuelled by angry resentment
over an address of March 1704 by the English House of Lords to the
queen concerning Queensberry’s plot to smear his rivals; this address
had also decried the open Scottish succession and called for a closer
union.36 The Country party continued to capitalise on public anger
over English hegemony by demanding reform of the Union of the
Crowns, a demand that was supported by the Cavaliers. A resolve from
the duke of Hamilton insisted that Parliament should not name a
successor before ‘we have had a previous treaty with England in relation
to Commerce and other Concerns with that Nation’. This became
conjoined with a Court resolve for limitations to produce a motion
that ‘took with the house’ and was supported by ‘a vast plurality of
voices’ in the estates as attentive crowds outside cheered the leaders
of the opposition. Hamilton then offered the 1703 Act of Security with
the clause on communication of trade removed, followed by a separate
resolve for a treaty with England. Fletcher backed the latter with an
overture for the nomination of treaty commissioners. This was taken up
by Parliament almost to the point of naming the commissioners, but
when the dukes of Atholl and Hamilton, as rival opposition leaders,
could not agree on a slate of candidates, Parliament moved on to
consider Queensberry’s plot.37 Despite this slip, the opposition secured
another patriotic resolve that condemned the Lords’ address as ‘an
undue Intermeddling with our concerns, and an Incroachment upon
the Independency, Honour and Sovereignty of this Nation’. Parliament
also voted to address Anne, warning that ‘nothing can obstruct more
our comeing into . . . the succession’ than ‘any more encroachments of
that nature’. A final address to the queen closed the session with a
protest against the paucity of the papers sent up from London for a
parliamentary investigation of the Queensberry plot.38
Tweeddale’s New Party had promised in Anne’s opening letter that
the government would introduce acts for ‘quieting the minds of all
35 Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 63–5, 84, 89.
36 Journals of the House of Lords, vol. 17, (London), pp. 505–6, 554.
37 APS, vol. xi, pp. 127–9; Minuts, no. 3 (13 July 1704), nos. 5–6 (19, 21 July 1704);
Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 72–5, 78–9; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 138–40,
143–4.
38 Minuts, no. 11 (8 August 1704); APS, vol. xi, pp. 152, 204–5; Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s
Ruine’, pp. 76–7; Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 161–2.
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our good subjects’, including ‘Terms and Conditions of Government’;
but they could only guarantee ‘whatever can in reason be demanded,
and is in our power to grant’.39 With these restrictions, the New
Party could not secure the succession, even though the renewed
war with France now allowed Marchmont, and several supporting
pamphleteers, to highlight a Franco-Jacobite threat to the Revolution
interest. Meanwhile, Tweeddale faced a new level of oppositional
aggression as an attempt was made to tack the Act of Security to an act
for supply. In order to prevent this and to secure the much-needed cess
for a wartime army, Tweeddale gave the royal assent to the reintroduced
Act of Security.40
Even without the clause on free trade, the price paid by Tweeddale
for supply became a political liability for Anne and her ministers in
England. In response, a Whig-led English Parliament passed the 1705
Alien Act, designed to force the Scottish Parliament either to settle
the succession or to nominate commissioners for union negotiations.
This, combined with the concurrent trial in Edinburgh of an English
crew suspected of pirating a Company of Scotland ship, produced
an explosion of anti-English feeling in Scotland, expressed in angry
pamphleteering and riotous crowds. Public animosity ensured that
three members of the English crew were hanged for piracy in April
as the privy council resisted pressure from London for a reprieve.
Though the New Party hoped that the hangings would gain them
support in the next parliamentary session, Anne turned to the second
duke of Argyll to form a new government. Under immense pressure
to resolve the Scottish situation, Argyll brought back the duke of
Queensberry and expelled the New Party from office. When his new
ministry could not agree on whether to attempt to gain the succession
by means of limitations or a treaty, the queen’s letter left this up to
Parliament.41
Despite Queensberry’s return to the Court party, Argyll still needed
to attract members from the squadrone volante, the Cavaliers, or
Hamilton’s Country party in order to make a parliamentary majority.
Country pressure since 1700 for a treaty to reform the Anglo-Scottish
union proved to be the key for Argyll as he capitalised on what
Lockhart called a ‘great inclination in the house to set a treaty on
foot’. Both the earl of Mar for the Court party and Hamilton for the
Country party proposed resolves for a treaty with England and both
Court and Country pamphlets now urged an act for a treaty, though
39 APS, vol. xi, pp. 125–6.
40 Anon., The Great Danger of Scotland as to All its Sacred and Civil Concerns ([Edinburgh,
1704]); Anon., A Watch-word to Scotland in Perilous Times ([Edinburgh, 1704]); Hume
of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 138, 144–8, 151; Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 72, 77–8;
APS, vol. xi, pp. 130, 133, 136–7.
41 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 41–3, 80; G. E. M. Kynynmond, Earl of Minto (ed.),
Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, MDCCII-MDCCVIII (Edinburgh, 1842),
pp. 64–6, 104, 107; APS, vol. xi, pp. 213–4.
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Country writers firmly rejected the notion that incorporating union
should be an outcome of treaty talks.42 After acts had been passed
on trade and limitations, momentum increased for a treaty with the
defeat of a Country clause demanding the repeal of the Alien Act
before negotiations could commence. A majority settled for an address
to the queen expressing their resentment of the Alien Act as well as
their interest in a ‘nearer and more complete union’. There was not,
however, any mention of incorporation in the act for a treaty, nor had
entire union been mentioned in the queen’s letter. Only luck allowed
ministers to defeat a clause from Hamilton that the union would not
‘derogat any ways from any Fundamental Laws, Ancient Priviledges,
Offices, Rights, Dignities, and Liberties of this Kingdom’, as the
absence of several Country and Cavalier members meant there was a
bare majority of two votes against the motion. Other safeguards became
necessary to secure votes: the act blocked discussion of alterations in
the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and required that Parliament ratify
any treaty resulting from the authorised negotiations. These measures,
combined with memories of the failed talks of 1702–3, brought some
members to see the act for a treaty as an easy way out of the Alien Act
impasse.43
The passage of the 1705 act for a treaty demonstrated that the Court
party could regain control of Parliament only when it engaged with
longstanding demands for reform of the Anglo-Scottish union, and
particularly for a treaty on trade. Private agreements with factional
interests also played a part, as Queensberry brought his followers
back to the Court party and as dealings with the duke of Hamilton
ensured that the queen would nominate the Scottish negotiators.44 Yet
these arrangements alone could not secure the act for a treaty; the
government also had to collect votes by drawing on the public interest
in reform of the existing union, without specifying the introduction of
an incorporating union. Given the conditional nature of many of these
votes, the queen faced a fresh management challenge when it came to
ratifying her treaty of incorporation in 1706–7.
The experience of 1705 suggested that ministers might continue
to win over elements of the opposition if they could portray the
treaty as a patriotic response to public complaints on the union. As
Seafield put it in late 1705, ‘there is no other way of taking from
the opposing party their pretensions of having a country-interest,
42 Hume of Crossrigg, Diary, pp. 163, 165; Anon., A Speech Concerning a Treaty of Union
with England ([Edinburgh, 1705]); Anon., A Speech Intended to have been Spoken in
Parliament by a Member who was Necessarily Absent ([Edinburgh, 1705]).
43 In contrast, the 1702 act for treaty negotiations had been passed with a less restrictive
letter to the queen asking her to preserve the Presbyterian Church. APS, vol. xi,
pp. 26–7, 213–14, 236–8, 295;Minuts, no. 29 (31 August 1705); Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s
Ruine’, pp. 95, 100–3.
44 Minuts, no. 19 (14 August 1705); Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 86, 89, 105–6,
108–9.
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but by having a treaty’.45 Recent historians have emphasised that the
treaty did respond to Scottish demands by offering free trade and
compensation for the Company of Scotland. The treaty also provided
an agreement on the Hanoverian succession, which many Revolution
supporters desired, provided it was combined with reforms of the
union. When parliamentary speeches, pamphlets, petitions and protests
expressed manifold objections to incorporating union, especially the
threat to the Presbyterian Church, the loss of Scottish sovereignty, and
the burden of higher taxes, Scottish ministers ignored advice from
London and negotiated further guarantees for the security of the
Presbyterian Church, along with articles on the Scottish regalia and
on trade and taxation.46 At the same time, Court party writers offered
not just a few pamphlets but extensive printed arguments in support of
incorporating union, claiming a patriotic stance for the treaty in direct
competition with the Country party.47 Alongside this new populism, the
government also produced its now well-known management incentives,
including secret payment of arrears of salary to selected members
of the Court party and the allocation of lucrative post-union jobs
to key factional leaders.48 This combination of attractions drew the
Presbyterian squadrone volante into alliance with the Court party, leaving
the Cavaliers and the Countrymen as a minority interest under the
leadership of the rival dukes of Atholl and Hamilton.49
By late November 1706, it seemed that the government had
managed to offer enough concessions and carrots to build a stable
parliamentary majority. Fervent and sometimes violent public protests
still threatened to disrupt the parliamentary session, but ideological
differences between Country and Cavalier interests now began to reduce
the effectiveness of the opposition. While in previous years the Country
and Cavalier groups would work together to delay the succession,
the negotiation of a treaty that included free trade forced Hamilton’s
Country party to press instead for the Hanoverian succession with
limitations. In turn, Cavalier resistance to Hanover undermined
attempts to formulate a united Country-Cavalier challenge to the treaty.
The two groups did co-operate in a campaign to generate dozens
of petitions from burghs, shires and parishes, in part by developing
a joint statement that condemned the treaty without mentioning the
succession. Their disagreements, however, undermined two potentially
significant mass protests: a gathering of petitioners in Edinburgh in
December 1706 and a walk-out of the opposition in January, both of
which were to be followed by an address to the queen. In December, as
hundreds of Jacobites and Presbyterians alike poured into Edinburgh,
45 McCormick (ed.), State-Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares, p. 738.
46 Whatley, Scots and the Union; Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion.
47 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 103–14; K. Bowie, ‘Popular resistance, religion and
the Union of 1707’, in T. M. Devine (ed.), Scotland and the Union (Edinburgh, 2008).
48 Ferguson, ‘The making of the treaty’, pp. 106–10.
49 Patrick and Whatley, ‘Persistence, principle and patriotism’.
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Hamilton insisted that an address to the queen should not only ask
for the election of a new Parliament but advocate the Hanoverian
succession as well. As the leaders argued over this, the government
dispersed their followers with a proclamation forbidding unauthorised
meetings. In January, some Cavalier members agreed to join a last-ditch
walkout even though the protest statement drafted by the Country
party promoted the Hanoverian succession. Atholl, however, would
not support the statement, leaving the planned exodus leaderless – as
Hamilton refused to act for fear of being blamed by the queen for
wrecking the treaty.50 The collapse of this final oppositional manoeuvre
allowed ministers to confirm the ratification of the treaty on 16 January
1707.
***
Those who focus on the contrast between the parliamentary sessions
of 1703–4 and 1706–7 usually struggle to explain the ratification of
the treaty of union in terms other than corruption and management.
This chapter has suggested that by taking a longer perspective of
1700 to 1707, the ratification of union can be seen as resulting from
an extended crisis during which the Court party collapsed under
the pressure of pervasive grievances brought to parliamentary politics
by a populist Country party. From 1703, the election of a Cavalier
faction further disrupted the Court party and reinforced the patriotic
opposition fronted by the Country party. Over time, the government
learned that to rebuild a Court party majority it would have to
acknowledge at least some popular grievances, offer public rationale
for its policies, and deploy augmented patronage resources. In 1706–7,
ministers reconstructed a Court party based on Revolution interests
by accommodating the ideological and personal interests of a former
Country faction, the squadrone volante, and by reinforcing the loyalties
of Court party followers. This was done through a combination of
private incentives and extensively advertised claims for the public
benefits of incorporation. At the same time, the terms of the treaty
exposed differences between the Country and Cavalier factions and
reduced their ability to concert effective resistance, despite their pursuit
of aggressively populist strategies drawing on fervent objections to
incorporating union.
Was the Scottish Parliament of 1706–7 ‘managed’ into accepting
a treaty of union? The answer to this depends on the definition of
management. For historians like Ferguson and Riley, management has
meant patronage and other private accommodations, used to secure
the compliance of factional leaders. Yet the evidence of 1700–5 shows
that many members of Parliament did not simply follow their leaders;
instead, they could be swayed by public debate and Country party
50 Szechi (ed.), ‘Scotland’s Ruine’, pp. 184–96; Bowie, ‘Popular resistance’, pp. 49–50.
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leadership to rebel against the Court party when crown policy was
inconsistent with their ideologies and interests. In 1706–7, ministers
made greater efforts to manage not just leaders but followers by offering
real concessions on grievances and substantive contributions to public
debates. Though intended to ‘manage’ Parliament, these activities
differed from patronage in relying on open dialogue rather than private
conversations. The use of patronage in personal negotiations continued
to be important, particularly in securing the acquiescence of party
leaders on both sides, but the dynamic political culture of the early
1700s also required the deployment of public persuasion to ensure the
co-operation of followers. We might call this management, but it was
not business as usual.
